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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, and pursuant to a conditional plea
agreement, Scott Cameron Freeland entered an Alford plea1 to felony grand theft by
possession of stolen property.  On appeal, Mr. Freeland asserts the district court erred
when it denied his motion to suppress.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
As stated in the district court’s findings of fact in the Memorandum Opinion Re
Motion to Suppress, Mike and Liza Maxwell owned a home in Twin Falls that included a
separate small house or cottage on the property.  (R., p.162.)  The Maxwells rented the
cottage to Mr. Freeland in the summer of 2014.  (R., p.162.)  Mr. Freeland became
delinquent on rent in the summer of 2015, and Mr. Maxwell came to suspect that
Mr. Freeland was engaging in drug activity on the premises.  (R., p.163.)  In late
December 2015, Mr. Maxwell asked Mr. Freeland to leave the property, but clarified he
did not have to leave immediately.  (R., p.163.)  Around January 5, 2016, Mr. Maxwell
specifically asked Mr. Freeland to be out no later than “the weekend.”  (R., p.163.)
Mr. Freeland responded he would try and stated Mr. Maxwell could sell some of the
property in the cottage and apply the proceeds to unpaid rent.  (R., p.163.)
Mr. Maxwell believed Mr. Freeland moved out the next day, but Ms. Maxwell saw
him leaving that Friday, January 8.  (R., p.163.)  Mr. Freeland did not return the key to
the cottage or have visible items with him when he left.  (R., p.163.)  The cottage had no
1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
2electricity from January 6 because Mr. Freeland had not paid the bill, and Mr. Maxwell
shut off water to the cottage around January 10.  (R., p.163.)  The Maxwells observed
no one had entered the cottage between January 8 and January 27.  (R., p.163.)
On January 27, 2016, Mr. Maxwell entered the cottage to clean it out.
(R., p.163.)  Inside, he found a watch box that had last been in his basement, drug
paraphernalia, items that he believed belonged to Ms. Maxwell, and 9 mm ammunition
he suspected was for a handgun missing from Mr. Maxwell’s house.  (R., p.164.)  He
called the police to ask that an officer remove the contraband items from the property,
and Officer Smriko arrived at the cottage.  (R., p.164.)  Mr. Maxwell stated Mr. Freeland
had left the property about three weeks earlier, had not returned, and had told
Mr. Maxwell that Mr. Maxwell could sell his stuff.  (R., p.164.)  Mr. Maxwell gave the
officer permission to enter the cottage, showed the officer the items he had discovered,
and stated he suspected Mr. Freeland had stolen property from him.  (R., p.164.)
Officer Smriko noted the cottage was cold, there were maggots and/or mold on
food and unwashed dishes, and the cottage was generally messy.  (R., p.164.)  The
officer filed a theft report naming Mr. Freeland as a suspect and told the Maxwells they
should call the police if Mr. Freeland returned to the premises.  (R., p.164.)
According to the district court’s findings of fact, on the evening of January 28,
Mr. Freeland returned to the Maxwells seeking permission to enter the cottage to
retrieve some items.  (R., p.164.)  Ms. Maxwell and Mr. Freeland had a conversation,
and accounts differed as to how heated it was.  (R., p.164 & n.3.)  Ms. Maxwell’s
3daughter, Stephanie Hall, made a 311 call2 and reported “Scott” was outside with her
parents, there was “yelling,” and her mother was “talking loud.”  (R., p.164.)
Officers Solomon and Hutchison were dispatched to the Maxwells on a
disturbance call, and were informed that a theft report had been filed against
Mr. Freeland.  (R., pp.164-65.)  As the officers approached the porch, they saw
Mr. Freeland and Ms. Maxwell.  (R., p.165.)  Officer Hutchison saw Mr. Freeland’s
hands move towards his waist, and in response drew his service pistol and ordered
Mr. Freeland to “get his hands up.”  (R., p.165.)  Mr. Freeland complied,
Officer Hutchison lowered his pistol, and Officer Solomon went just inside the house to
speak with Ms. Maxwell.  (R., p.165.)
While Officer Solomon was inside, Officer Hutchison spoke with Mr. Freeland for
about six or seven minutes.  (R., p.165.)  The officer saw Mr. Freeland’s sweater
appeared to bulge, and asked him to lift his sweater and display his waistband.
(R., p.165.)  Mr. Freeland did so in a “unique” manner, and Officer Hutchison saw some
of Mr. Freeland’s waistband and did not believe him to be armed at that point.
(R., p.165.)  The officer Mirandized3 Mr. Freeland and spoke with him about his history
and associations.  (R., p.165.)
As reflected in the district court’s findings of fact, Officer Solomon learned from
Ms. Maxwell that the Maxwells suspected Mr. Freeland of theft, and the officer returned
to Officer Hutchison and Mr. Freeland to ask Mr. Freeland about the stolen items.
(R., p.165.)  Officer Solomon asked Officer Hutchison if he had frisked Mr. Freeland,
2 People within the Twin Falls city limits may use 311 to place non-emergency cell
phone calls to the police.  City of Twin Falls, City Communications Center,
http://www.tfid.org/index.aspx?NID=301 (last visited Feb. 15, 2017).
4and Officer Hutchison responded he had not.  (R., p.165.)  The district court found,
“Hutchison asked Freeland if he could check Freeland’s pockets, and Freeland offered
to empty his own pockets.  While Freeland was doing so, Hutchison observed ‘hard
black plastic’ on Freeland’s right hip.”  (R., p.165.)  According to the district court,
“Hutchison believed this was a holster and immediately demanded that Freeland turn
around with his hands behind his back.  Hutchison then frisked Freeland and found a
handgun.”  (R., p.165.)
The State charged Mr. Freeland by Information with one count of unlawful
possession of a firearm, felony, I.C. § 18-3316, and one count of grand theft by
possession of stolen property, felony, I.C. §§ 18-2403(4), 18-2407(1)(b)(6), and 18-
2409.  (R., pp.63-65.)  Mr. Freeland pleaded not guilty.  (See R., p.81.)
Mr. Freeland filed a Motion to Suppress requesting “an order suppressing the
evidence obtained by the State in violation of Mr. Freeland’s constitutional rights both
Federal and State.”  (R., pp.116-25.)  Mr. Freeland asserted “his Fourth Amendment
Rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure [were] violated in two ways,”
first when Officer Smriko “entered Mr. Freeland’s residence without Mr. Freeland’s
consent and without first obtaining a search warrant.”  (R., pp.116-17.)  Mr. Freeland
asserted his Fourth Amendment protection was next violated when Officers Solomon
and Hutchinson “impermissibly searched him and that any evidence procured as a
result of that search of his person be suppressed.”  (R., p.117.)  Mr. Freeland’s
assertion regarding this impermissible search of his person relied upon State v.
Henage, 143 Idaho 655 (2007).  (R., pp.120-23.)
3 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5The State filed a State’s Response To Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.
(R., pp.148-58.)  The State argued Mr. Maxwell had abandoned the cottage and
therefore did not have standing to challenge Officer’s Smriko’s warrantless entry;
alternatively, the State argued Mr. Maxwell had apparent authority to consent to the
search.  (R., p.154.)  As for the search of Mr. Freeland’s person, the State contended
Mr. Freeland voluntarily consented to a search of his person and offered to empty his
pockets.  (R., p.156.)  The State argued Officer Hutchinson saw part of a gun holster in
plain view while Mr. Freeland was emptying his pockets, and the officer physically
restrained and frisked Mr. Freeland given he had made a furtive movement to his
waistband and possibly lied about having a weapon.  (R., p.156.)  Thus, the State
requested the district court deny the motion to suppress.  (R., p.157.)
The district court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress over two days.
(R., pp.159, 161.)  The parties stipulated to the admission of recordings of Ms. Hall’s
311 call and Officer Solomon’s audio.  (Tr., p.11, L.3 – p.12, L.5; see Def. Exs. 1 & 2.)
Mr. Freeland’s counsel in closing arguments asserted Henage was controlling
with respect to the search of Mr. Freeland’s person.  (Tr., p.182, Ls.7-11.)  Counsel
asserted, “[t]here’s no testimony in this record that Mr. Freeland posed a potential risk.”
(Tr., p.183, Ls.8-9.)   Mr. Freeland’s counsel had asked Officer Solomon, “when
Mr. Freeland began to empty his pockets, if that was the first stop in the patdown
process, and she said yes, that there is a procedure.”  (Tr., p.183, Ls.19-22.)  Counsel
took that to mean “there is a procedure, you start out by emptying pockets, because
there is no violence, there was no threat to safety, they had the time and the ability to
6empty their pockets first, and then they were going to pat Mr. Freeland down.  And I
think that’s in direct contravention to Henage.”  (Tr., p.183, L.22 – p.184, L.3.)
Mr. Freeland’s counsel continued: “Officer Hutchison says that as he began
searching, as he had Mr. Freeland empty his pockets, which is a search, whether it’s
the police officer taking things out of the pocket after feeling it, or having Mr. Freeland
take them out, the result is the same, they are searching his pockets, they are searching
his person.”  (Tr., p.184, Ls.4-9.)  Counsel submitted “the characterization that the lead
officer, Officer Solomon, puts on this circumstance that when she asked
Officer Hutchison if he had patted him down, and the patdown began, it began with
what’s in your pockets first.  And then patdown.”  (Tr., p.184, Ls.10-14.)  Counsel
asserted “that just like in Henage, where they knew that the individual had a knife, even
if Officer Hutchison saw a thin plastic strip, there was no exhibition, there was no
indication from Mr. Freeland that there was any threat of safety.”  (Tr., p.184, Ls.19-23.)
After the hearing, the district court issued a Memorandum Opinion Re Motion to
Suppress.  (R., pp.162-70.)  The district court, assuming without deciding that
Mr Freeland had standing to challenge the search of the cottage, determined
Officer Smriko’s search was justified because Mr. Maxwell had apparent authority to
consent to the search.  (See R., p.167.)
Regarding the search of Mr. Freeland’s person, the district court determined
Officer Hutchison’s experience was “much different than the officer’s in Henage,”
because the officers were responding at night to a disturbance call and the encounter
with Mr. Freeland began with Mr. Freeland “reaching towards his waist, at which point
Hutchison drew his service pistol in the ‘low ready’ position.”  (R., pp.168-69.)  After
7Mr. Freeland complied, and when asked stated that he did not have any weapons,
Officer Hutchison’s “initial concern was dispelled for a time.”  (R., p.169.)
According to the district court, Officer Hutchison “testified that he became
‘scared’ when he observed hard black plastic on Freeland’s right hip, which looked like
a holster.  Hutchison unequivocally testified that this discovery is what led him to frisk
Freeland.”  (R., p.169.)  The district court determined, “[t]he critical distinction from
Henage is Freeland’s failure to be truthful with the officers about being armed.  When
Hutchison learned that Freeland had been hiding the weapon, the seemingly peaceful
encounter dissolved because Hutchison realized that Freeland was both armed and had
misled Hutchison into thinking he was not armed.”  (R., p.169 (footnote omitted).)  The
district court stated the defendant in Henage, in contrast, “was forthright about having a
knife.”  (R., p.169.)  The district court therefore found Mr. Freeland’s “frisk was justified
by a reasonable fear for the officers’ safety.”  (R., p.169.)  The district court denied
Mr. Freeland’s motion to suppress in its entirety.  (R., p.169.)
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Mr. Freeland subsequently agreed to
plead guilty by way of an Alford plea to grand theft by possession.  (R., pp.197-208.)
Mr. Freeland reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
(R., pp.197, 201, 208.)  The State agreed to dismiss the unlawful possession of a
firearm count.  (R., p.208.)  The district court accepted Mr. Freeland’s Alford plea.
(R., p.197.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years, with three years
fixed.  (R., pp.216-21.)  Mr. Freeland filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district
8court’s Judgment of Conviction upon a Plea of Guilty to One Felony Count, and Order of
Commitment.  (R., pp.223-27.)
9ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Freeland’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Freeland’s Motion To Suppress
A. Introduction
Mr. Freeland asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress, because the search of his person was unlawful.  The officers started the
search of Mr. Freeland’s person by having him empty his pockets.  At the time the
officers had Mr. Freeland empty his pockets, under the totality of the circumstances a
reasonable person would not have concluded that Mr. Freeland posed a risk of danger.
Thus, the search of Mr. Freeland’s person was unlawful and the evidence obtained as a
result of the search should have been suppressed.
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
The standard of review for a motion to suppress is bifurcated.  An appellate court
defers to the trial court’s findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous, and
freely reviews the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the facts as
found. State v. Hankey, 134 Idaho 844, 846 (2000).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Evidence obtained in violation of this
constitutional protection generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of the
illegal government action. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810-11 (2009).  This
exclusionary rule “applies to evidence obtained directly from the illegal government
action and to evidence discovered through the exploitation of the original illegality, or
the fruit of the poisonous tree.” Id. at 811.
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“Any warrantless search or seizure of a citizen is presumptively unreasonable
unless if falls within certain specific and well-delineated exceptions.” Halen v. State,
136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002).  “When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the
defendant, the State bears the burden to show that a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement is applicable.” Id.  “One such exception is the pat-down search for
weapons acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, [392 U.S.
1, 27 (1968)].” Bishop, 146 Idaho at 818.  “Under Terry,  an  officer  may  conduct  a
limited pat-down search, or frisk, ‘of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his
or her body in an attempt to find weapons.’” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 16).
A Terry frisk “is only justified when, at the moment of the frisk, the officer has
reason to believe that the individual he or she is investigating is ‘armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or others’ and nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
dispels the officer’s belief.” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 30.)  “The test is an
objective one that asks whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonably
prudent person would be justified in concluding that the individual posed a risk of
danger.” Id. (citing State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660-61 (2007)).
In Bishop and Henage, the Idaho Supreme Court explained: “To satisfy this
standard, the officer must indicate ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts,’ in light of his or her experience, justify the
officer’s suspicion that the individual was armed and dangerous.” Id. at 818-19 (quoting
Henage, 143 Idaho at 660).  “Although an officer need not possess absolute certainty
that an individual is armed and dangerous, an officer’s inchoate and unparticularized
12
suspicion or hunch is not enough to justify a frisk.” Id. at 819 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
C. The Officers Started The Search Of Mr. Freeland’s Person When They Had Him
Empty His Pockets
Mr. Freeland asserts that the officers started the search of his person when they
had him empty his pockets after Officer Solomon left the Maxwells’ house and spoke
with Officer Hutchison and Mr. Freeland.
In its findings of fact, the district court stated Officer “Hutchison asked Freeland if
he could check Freeland’s pockets, and Freeland offered to empty his own pockets.”
(R., p.165.)  While the district court determined the frisk was justified, it did not address
whether the search of Mr. Freeland’s person started when the officers had him empty
his pockets.  (See R., pp.168-69.)  Mr. Freeland submits the search of his person
started when the officers had him empty his pockets, not with the frisk.
Typically, a Terry limited pat-down search or frisk is “of the outer surfaces of a
person’s clothing all over his body in an attempt to find weapons.” See, e.g., Bishop,
146 Idaho at 818 (internal quotation marks omitted).  However, the Idaho Court of
Appeals has explained that “limited exceptions to this standard have been recognized.”
State v. Tyler, 153 Idaho 623, 627 (Ct. App. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Tyler Court stated, “[f]or example, a more intrusive search may be permissible
when the suspect makes threatening movements, or when the officer sees a weapon-
like bulge in the suspect’s clothing.” Id. (citations omitted).  The Tyler Court clarified
that such exceptions do not expand the scope of Terry: “Additional intrusions are not
allowed in every case, but are ‘strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify
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[their] initiation.” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 26).  “Thus, whether the officer pats
down an individual’s outer clothing or takes additional measures, ‘in justifying the
particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, if taken together, with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion.’” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).
While it appears the topic is one of first impression in Idaho, courts in some other
jurisdictions have held officers having an individual empty his or her pockets constitutes
a limited search covered by Terry. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 349 F.3d 219,
225 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Agent Morales’ request that defendant empty his pockets and lift
his shirt was permissible under Terry.”); United States v. DiGiacomo, 579 F.2d 1211,
1215 (10th Cir. 1978) (“[A]n examination of the contents of a person’s pocket is clearly a
search, whether the pocket is emptied by the officer or by the person under the
compulsion of the circumstances.”); State v. Hlavacek, 407 S.E.2d 375, 380 (W. Va.
1991) (“Sergeant Hylton stated that requiring the appellant to empty his pockets made
the frisk ‘more complete.’  While this is undeniably true, we conclude that the extent of
the intrusion also made the frisk unconstitutional.”); State v. Ingram, 970 P.2d 1151,
1154 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (“[A] request to empty one’s pockets, under circumstances
similar to those in this case, is a search without consent. . . .   [B]y directing Defendant
to empty his pockets, the officer exceeded the constitutionally permissible bounds of a
Terry search.”); State v. Franklin, 619 N.E.2d 1182, 1184 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (“[The
officer’s] command to Franklin to empty his pockets was an intrusion which exceeded
the limited frisk of the outside of the clothing envisioned under Terry.  This search
converted the investigatory stop to an unlawful arrest without probable cause . . . .”).
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Based on the above, Mr. Freeland submits the officers having him empty his
pockets was an intrusion that constituted a limited search covered by Terry. See Tyler,
153 Idaho at 627.  Thus, the search of Mr. Freeland’s person started when the officers
had him empty his pockets.
 D. At The Time The Officers Had Mr. Freeland Empty His Pockets, Under The
Totality Of The Circumstances A Reasonable Person Would Not Have
Concluded That Mr. Freeland Posed A Risk Of Danger
Mr. Freeland asserts that, at the time the officers had Mr. Freeland empty his
pockets, under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person would not have
concluded that Mr. Freeland posed a risk of danger.  Thus, the search of Mr. Freeland’s
person was unlawful.
As discussed above, a Terry search or frisk “is only justified when, at the moment
of the frisk, the officer has reason to believe that the individual he or she is investigating
is ‘armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others’ and nothing in the initial
stages of the encounter dispels the officer’s belief.’” Bishop, 146 Idaho at 818 (quoting
Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 30).  The Idaho Supreme Court in Bishop and Henage explained,
“[t]he test is an objective one that asks whether, under the totality of the circumstances,
a reasonably prudent person would be justified in concluding that the individual posed a
risk of danger.” Id. (citing Henage, 143 Idaho at 660-61).
The Idaho Supreme Court in Bishop listed several factors that “influence whether
a reasonable person in the officer’s position would conclude that a particular person
was armed and dangerous,” including
whether there were any bulges in the suspect’s clothing that resembled a
weapon; whether the encounter took place late at night or in a high crime
area; and whether the individual made threatening or furtive movements,
15
indicated that he or she possessed a weapon, appeared nervous or
agitated, appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs,
was unwilling to cooperate, or had a reputation for being dangerous.
Id. at 819.  The Court observed, “[w]hether any of these considerations, taken together
or by themselves, are enough to justify a Terry frisk depends on an analysis of the
totality of the circumstances.” Id.  “For a frisk to be held constitutional, an officer must
demonstrate how the facts he or she relied on in conducting the frisk support the
conclusion that the suspect posed a risk of danger.” Id.
Based on a consideration of the totality of the circumstances here at the time the
officers had Mr. Freeland empty his pockets, a reasonable person would not have
concluded Mr. Freeland posed a risk of danger.  Although Officer Hutchison initially saw
Mr. Freeland’s hands move towards his waist, and the officer drew his service pistol as
a result, Mr. Freeland complied with the officer’s order to raise his hands.  (See
R., p.165.)  After Mr. Freeland lifted his waistband at Officer Hutchison’s request, the
officer did not believe Mr. Freeland was armed at that point.  (See R., p.165.)
Officer Hutchison spoke with Mr. Freeland for about six or seven minutes without
incident.  (See R., p.165.)  While the encounter took place in the evening and the
officers went to the scene in response to a disturbance call (see R., p.164), the district
court did not make any findings that the encounter took place in a high crime area.  Nor
did the district court find Mr. Freeland appeared to be nervous or agitated, or that he
appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs.  (See R., pp.164-65.)
When the officers had Mr. Freeland empty his pockets, the only facts to justify a
search of his person were that Mr. Freeland had moved his hands to his waistband, and
the encounter was in response to a disturbance call late at night.  (See R., pp.164-65.)
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Those facts alone are not enough to justify the search, because they did not give the
officers reason to believe Mr. Freeland was armed and presently dangerous at the
moment of the search. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 818.  By that time, any potential
reasonable belief Mr. Freeland was armed and presently dangerous would have been
dispelled during the initial stages of the encounter. See id.  After the encounter began,
Mr. Freeland was compliant with the officers and spoke with Officer Hutchison for about
six or seven minutes without incident.  (See R., p.165.)  Thus, this record does not
contain evidence that would cause a reasonable person in the officers’ position to
conclude Mr. Freeland posed a risk of danger at the time they had him empty his
pockets. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 820-21; Henage, 143 Idaho at 661-62.
At the time the officers had Mr. Freeland empty his pockets, under the totality of
the circumstances a reasonable person would not have concluded that Mr. Freeland
posed a risk of danger.  Thus, the officers’ search of Mr. Freeland’s person by having
him empty his pockets was unlawful. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 821.  The evidence
obtained as a result of the search should have been suppressed. See Henage, 143
Idaho at 662-63.  The district court’s denial of Mr. Freeland’s motion to suppress should
be reversed, the judgment of conviction and order of commitment should be vacated,
and the case should be remanded to the district court for further proceedings. See id.
17
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Freeland respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the district court‘s order denying his motion to suppress, vacate the district court’s
judgment of conviction and order of commitment, and remand the case to the district
court for further proceedings.
DATED this 16th day of February, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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